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Trusting another to look after one's best interest when money
is at stake is difficult in many different situations. This is true in the
area of trust administration as well. As with most areas of law and
regulation, trust law addresses this concern primarily through the
requirement of information disclosure. Information disclosure to trust
beneficiaries has become a heated issue among trust scholars and
practitioners. Interestingly, as fundamental as disclosure may be in
trust administration, the duty to disclose is not precisely defined at
common law and is far from uniform. This creates a profusion of
problems for trustees who operate in multiple jurisdictions,1 or who
are attempting to fulfill fiduciary or administrative duties that are not
clearly defined. States recently have mentioned this desirability for
clarity and uniformity when modifying their own trust laws.
Additionally, litigation against trustees is on the rise.2 While there are
many reasons for this recent uptick in litigation,3 the chance that a
trustee will violate her obligations as a fiduciary, and therefore be
subject to litigation, increases when the trustee fails to fully
understand her duties. 4 This is especially true in an area of law as
complex and varied as a trustee's duty to disclose trust information to
its beneficiaries.
Underlying the difficulties in a trustee's attempt to fulfill this
duty are two fundamental and seemingly opposing principles of trust
law. On the one hand, "trust law typically accord[s] a trust settlor
nearly unfettered latitude to determine which trust terms and
restrictions would benefit her chosen beneficiaries. . . ."5 This
principle advocates for a system of default rules that would allow a
settlor to prohibit information disclosure and protect the trust funds
against attack by immature or rival beneficiaries. On the other hand,
"[i]t is an accepted principle of trust law that a private trust exists to
1. Dana G. Fitzsimons, Jr., Navigating the Trustee's Duty to Disclose, 23 PROB. & PROP.,
Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 40, 41.
2. Id. at 40.
3. For example, a Special Committee Report to the New Jersey Legislature advocating for
adoption of the UTC recognized the greater use of trusts in recent years and the "consequent rise
in the number of day-to-day questions involving trusts" coupled with "a recognition that the trust
law in many States is thin." N.J. LAw REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT RELATING TO UNIFORM
TRUST CODE 7 (2008), available at www.lawrev.state.nj.us/utc/utcFR060908.doc. The Report
advocated for adoption of the UTC to provide comprehensive guidance in the face of rising
litigation. Id.
4. Fitzsimons, supra note 1, at 40.
5. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor's Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and the
Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (2008).
[Vol. 64:3:925926
AGENTS IN SECRECY
benefit the beneficiaries thereof."6 Once a settlor has placed assets
into a trust, she has relinquished control over these assets. This
principle supports mandating information disclosure to trust
beneficiaries, the holders of equitable title in the trust assets.
Traditionally, as a result of these two principles, settlors could
construct the terms of their trusts with great discretion, but were
required under common law to provide at a minimum information
reasonably related to the beneficiary's interest in enforcing her rights
under the trust.
7
Just how a trustee should administer a trust in which a settlor
has prohibited disclosure to beneficiaries is an issue under debate,
particularly after the creation of the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC" or
the "Code").8  Since 2000, when the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") promulgated the
UTC, twenty-three jurisdictions have adopted portions of the UTC.9
Interestingly, no state has adopted the Code's provisions on the duty
to inform verbatim. Rather, the enacting states have modified those
provisions in various ways, with the result that no two states'
provisions on the duty to inform are precisely the same. 10 These
deviations, which typically decrease the amount of mandatory
information disclosure, indicate reluctance by state legislatures to
completely accept the UTC's guidance regarding mandatory trust
information disclosure.
This Note focuses on the duty to disclose as it applies to
irrevocable trusts. An irrevocable trust is a trust in which the settlor
has relinquished the right to terminate the trust and, therefore, has
completely passed legal title on to the trustee.1 The UTC sections that
have incited so much debate over nondisclosure only apply to
irrevocable trusts. This Note does not address revocable trusts
6. Id. at 1166.
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (1959) ("Although the terms of the
trust may regulate the amount of information which the trustee must give and the frequency
with which it must be given, the beneficiary is always entitled to such information as is
reasonably necessary to enable him to enforce his rights under the trust or to prevent or redress
a breach of trust.").
8. Kevin D. Millard, The Trustee's Duty to Inform and Report Under the Uniform Trust
Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 373, 374-75 (2005) ('Tihere remains considerable
uncertainty and disagreement about the duty to inform and report, and about the extent to
which the duty is or should be mandatory.").
9. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Maine, Missouri, Michigan, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and Wyoming. The UTC
has also been recently introduced in New Jersey, with adoption pending.
10. See infra Part II; see also Millard, supra note 8, at 383.
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1651(9th ed. 2009).
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because of the nearly uncontested principle-also present in the
UTC-that a trustee of a revocable trust is answerable only to the
settlor and complete nondisclosure to beneficiaries is therefore
permissible.12 Part II of this Note reviews the development of the duty
to disclose, beginning with the traditional common law requirement
that settlors provide at least some information to beneficiaries, then
examines the approach of the UTC, and finally looks to how states
have reacted to the UTC in their own enactment of a duty to inform.
Part III analyzes the policy concerns behind mandating disclosure, on
the one hand, and permitting nondisclosure, on the other. States have
addressed these policy concerns in different ways, and the result is
that there is not a uniform body of trust law on this important issue.
Finally, Part IV concludes that a surrogate should be appointed
to receive trust information on behalf of the beneficiaries. While the
majority of relevant scholarship concludes that beneficiaries are put at
too great a risk when settlors prohibit disclosure to beneficiaries, the
current scholarship does not account for the trend in UTC states of
allowing settlors to override mandatory disclosure. Given the great
number of states that have reduced or eliminated mandatory trust
information disclosure, this Note observes that advocacy of
information disclosure alone has not sufficed to persuade states to
adopt the UTC's position. Therefore, this Note explores and advocates
for a solution that would require disclosure in all irrevocable trusts,
but would allow a settlor to avoid that disclosure to the beneficiaries
themselves. The appointment of a surrogate to receive the information
instead of the beneficiaries allows the surrogate to ensure that the
interests of the beneficiaries are protected, but gives a settlor the right
to prohibit the trustee from disclosing information directly to the
beneficiaries, thus maintaining the settlor's personal privacy as well
as the confidentiality of the trust assets. By addressing the policy
12. But see J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Longmeyer, 275 S.W.3d 697, 701-02 (Ky.
2009) (holding that the trustee for a revocable trust had an affirmative duty to inform the
remainder beneficiaries of their removal). The Longmeyer decision came as a surprise to many
who labored under the generally accepted principle of trust law that the trustee of a revocable
trust was answerable only to the settlor of the trust up until the moment the settlor became
incapacitated or the trust became irrevocable. Although this is a big step forward in beneficiary's
rights, there is a likelihood that future litigation will sidestep the Longmeyer decision by limiting
its holding to its extraordinary facts. See Turney P. Berry, David M. English & Dana G.
Fitzsimons, Jr., Longmeyer Exposes (or Creates) Uncertainty About the Duty to Inform
Remainder Beneficiaries of a Revocable Trust, 35 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. 125, 126 (2009)
(discussing the effect the holding will have on trust law and the extent to which future courts
may limit its effect); cf Turney P. Berry, David M. English & Dana G. Fitzsimons, Jr., Disclose.
Disclose! Disclose?: Longmeyer Distorts the Trustee's Duty to Inform Trust Beneficiaries, 24 PROB.
& PROP., July-Aug. 2010, at 12 ('The court was aware, but seemingly unconcerned, that its
ruling would come as a surprise to clients and lawyers alike....').
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concerns on both sides of the debate, this solution provides the most
direct path toward promoting information disclosure and encouraging
trust law uniformity, as advocated by the drafters of the UTC.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT
Trust law is a creation of English common law and has
developed with great diversity among the various states, leading to
complications and confusion for parties administering trusts in
different states. This Part describes the development of the duty to
inform in trust administration. Specifically, Subpart A will first look
at the common law requirements, which existed until the development
of the UTC in 2000. Subpart B will then present the balance chosen by
the drafters of the UTC and describe the Code's relevant provisions.
Finally, Subpart C will look to the current state of the duty to inform
in those states that have adopted portions of the UTC. Identifying
those sections of the UTC that a state has chosen not to adopt is
informative when analyzing whether the UTC has found the right
balance in the policy debate between trust privacy and protection for
the beneficiaries' interests.
A. The Traditional Common Law Principle
From the creation of the trust instrument in the United States,
the body of trust law has been governed primarily by common law.
Historically, the settlor's intent is "the defining force in trust law."'
13
With a few exceptions, the settlor was at liberty to decide which trust
terms and administration methods would best fulfill her intention for
her chosen beneficiaries. 14 This key principle would seem to support a
settlor's complete right to prohibit a trustee from disclosing any
information to beneficiaries. However, judicial decisions over the years
established patterns regarding the trustee's duty to provide
information to beneficiaries.
Under the most basic principle, a beneficiary of an irrevocable
trust is always entitled to information about the trust that is
reasonably necessary to allow the beneficiary to enforce the trust,
even if the terms of the trust restrict disclosure. 15 This traditional
13. Cooper, supra note 5, at 1171.
14. Id. at 1171-72.
15. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c (1959) ("Although the terms of the
trust may regulate the amount of information which the trustee must give and the frequency
with which it must be given, the beneficiary is always entitled to such information as is
reasonably necessary to enable him to enforce his rights under the trust or to prevent or redress
2011] 929
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principle requires that the existence of the trust itself must always be
disclosed 16 -if a beneficiary does not know that a trust even exists for
her benefit, then she will not be able to enforce that trust. The basic
fact that a trust exists, however, is not normally sufficient. The
trustee must also periodically provide beneficiaries information
regarding the administration and condition of the trust. 17 Without this
information about the method of administration, the beneficiaries may
remain unaware of breaches of fiduciary duty until it is too late to
obtain relief.
While the duty to inform is normally triggered when a
beneficiary requests information from the trustee, the duty is present
even without such a request if deemed to be necessary to protect the
beneficiary from a third party.18 For example, if the beneficiary is
about to sell her interest in a trust to a third party, and the trustee is
aware that the beneficiary's interest in that trust is more valuable
than the beneficiary realizes (and could justify demanding a higher
price from the third party), then the trustee is obligated to inform the
beneficiary of this information. 19 Additionally, the duty to inform is
not limited to current beneficiaries, but also runs "to future
beneficiaries regardless of whether [the future beneficiaries'] interests
are vested or contingent."20 In order to fulfill the duty to inform, a
trustee is required to provide a full copy of the trust instrument to the
beneficiaries, not merely those portions that directly relate to a
particular beneficiary.
21
A quick look at the different manner in which trust law treats
revocable, as opposed to irrevocable trusts, explains the concern for
beneficiaries' rights. Although this Note focuses on irrevocable trusts,
a breach of duty."); see also Millard, supra note 8, at 374 (discussing the purpose for a common
law duty to disclose).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82(a) (2003).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 (1959).
18. Id. § 173 cmt. d (The trustee "is under a duty to communicate to the beneficiary
material facts affecting the interest of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not
know and which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in dealing with a third person
with respect to his interest."); Fitzsimons, supra note 1, at 41.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
20. Fitzsimons, supra note 1, at 41; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172, cmt.
c (1959) ("The trustee may be compelled to account not only by a beneficiary presently entitled to
the payment of income or principal, but also by a beneficiary who will be or may be entitled to
receive income or principal in the future. This is true even though the interest of the beneficiary
is contingent.").
21. See Taylor v. Nationsbank Corp., 481 S.E.2d 358, 362 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that "absent an explicit provision in the trust to the contrary ... trust beneficiaries are entitled
to view the trust instrument from which their interest is derived); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 480
S.E.2d 488, 492 (Va. 1997) (holding that the beneficiary was entitled to view the trust
instruments in their entirety).
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it is worth noting that different rules apply to revocable trusts. As
long as a trust remains revocable and the settlor is alive and not
incapacitated, "the trustee generally owes a duty only to report to the
settlor and should generally not report to any other beneficiaries
without the settlor's consent."22 Therefore, the general disclosure
principles listed above did not extend at common law to the
administration of a revocable trust.23 This distinction between the
disclosure requirements for irrevocable and revocable trusts clarifies
the dispositive issue: trust assets exist entirely for the beneficiaries'
benefit. In the case of an irrevocable trust, the settlor no longer has
any beneficial interest in the trust assets. Therefore, while the
settlor's intent when she created the trust is fundamental to the
administration of the trust, her interests are no longer the most
important ones once the trust becomes irrevocable. For this reason, an
optimal information disclosure rule will be one that protects the
beneficiaries' rights.
Common law principles continue to evolve regarding a trustee's
duty to provide information. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts
revised the trustee's duty to provide information to beneficiaries,
making the duty more specific. 24 Case law has also produced a trend
that strengthens the duty to inform.25 In sum, "the history of the duty
to inform shows that Anglo-American trust law has regularly
recognized a duty in the trustee to provide information to the trust's
beneficiaries."26 This principle was recognized and codified in the UTC
in 2000.27
B. The Development of the Uniform Trust Code
Greater use of trusts and the related rise in the amount of
litigation involving trust administration led NCCUSL to analyze the
22. Fitzsimons, supra note 1, at 42.
23. But see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
24. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 82 reporter's notes (2003) ('The black letter of
Subsection (2) of this Section is similar in substance to the black letter of Restatement Second,
Trusts § 173, although the other aspects of this Section reflect needs or trends that were not
expressly recognized in the prior edition ....").
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1615 (2007).
27. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a) (amended 2005) ("A trustee shall keep the qualified
beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the
material facts necessary for them to protect their interests.").
2011]
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state of trust law in the early 1990s. 28 NCCUSL found that trust law
in most states was thin, with many gaps between the few statutes and
reported cases, and that previous attempts at uniform acts relating to
trusts, while numerous, were fragmentary. 29 NCCUSL recognized a
need for a uniform body of trust law that would "update, fill out, and
systemize the American law of trusts."
30
A uniform body of trust law among the states is beneficial for
trustees and the beneficiaries who rely upon them. Although family
members are regularly appointed as trustees, an increasing number of
settlors have chosen to appoint the more expensive, but often more
reliable and professional, institutional trustee. These institutions
routinely administer trusts that are governed by the laws of different
states. These trustees must constantly keep themselves apprised of
the differing trust laws in each state that govern one or more of the
trustee's trusts to ensure compliance. Further, beneficiaries of trusts
are spread all over the world and are receiving legal advice in those
differing jurisdictions on how to best protect their interests. In
recognition of this need for uniformity, NCCUSL created what is now
known as the Uniform Trust Code. 3
1
The UTC codified many of the common law principles
regarding the duty to provide information. 32 The UTC was drafted in
close coordination with the new revision of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts and parallels that Restatement's strong disclosure duties.33
Although the UTC follows the common law tradition of generally
providing default rules that apply only to the extent the settlor does
not provide otherwise in the instrument,34 section 105 of the UTC
specifically prohibits the settlor from waiving certain of the trustee's
obligations by listing fourteen unwaivable duties.35 The unwaivable
duties relating to information disclosure are specifically outlined in
28. See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and




31. UNIF. TRUST CODE (2000). The UTC was amended in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005.
32. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (amended 2005) (codifying the common law
principle that the terms of the trust should prevail unless a given exception applies).
33. See English, supra note 28, at 148 ('The UTC was drafted in close coordination with
this revision of the Restatement of Trusts to the extent that a significant minority, if not
majority, of the UTC provisions could be described as a codification of the Restatement.").
34. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the
trust....").
35. See id. § 105(b) (' The terms of the trust prevail over any provision of this Code
except .. ") (emphasis added).
932 [Vol. 64:3:925
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UTC section 813, which imposes a general obligation to keep the
beneficiaries informed as well as several specific notice
requirements. 36 For one, the settlor may not override the trustee's
duty to notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who have
attained twenty-five years of age 37 of the existence of the trust, of the
identity of the trustee, and of their right to request trustee's reports.
38
Additionally, a settlor may not eliminate the trustee's duty to respond
to the information request of a beneficiary of an irrevocable trust.39
The effect of mandating portions of the disclosure duties listed
in section 813 is that, with respect to beneficiaries age twenty-five and
older, a settlor may dispense with all of the requirements of section
813 except for the duties to inform the beneficiaries of the existence of
the trust and of the identity of the trustee, and to provide a
beneficiary upon request with such reports as the trustee may have
prepared. 40 Among the specific section 813 requirements that a settlor
may waive are the duty to provide a beneficiary upon request with a
copy of the trust instrument 41 and the requirement that the trustee
provide annual reports to the qualified beneficiaries. 42 However, the
2006 comments to section 105, which outlines the default and
mandatory rules, note that the trustee may be required to furnish a
copy of the entire trust instrument and prepare an annual report in a
particular case, if such information is requested by a beneficiary and
is reasonably related to the trust's administration.43 Thus, while
section 105 seems to allow a trustee to avoid providing a copy of the
trust to a beneficiary, in certain circumstances, if a copy is requested,
the trustee would be required to provide it. While these comments
36. Beyond those mandatory duties listed below, the discretionary, but recommended,
disclosure duties of a trustee include the general duty to keep the qualified beneficiaries of a
trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and to respond to a request for
information reasonably related to the administration of the trust, the duty to furnish a copy of
the entire trust instrument upon request, the duty to notify qualified beneficiaries in advance of
any change in the method or rate of the trustee's compensation, and the duty to send annual
reports of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and disbursements. Id. § 813.
37. This age requirement recognizes that settlors may have reasons for wanting to keep a
young beneficiary from discovering her interest in a trust. For example, a settlor may not want a
beneficiary who is trying to decide whether to go to college to allow a potentially large trust
interest to dissuade her from furthering her education.
38. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8). "Qualified beneficiary" is defined by the UTC to be a
beneficiary who is currently a distributee of trust income or who would be if either the current
distributees or the trust instrument terminated. Id. § 103(13).
39. Id. § 105(b)(9).
40. Id. § 105 cmt.
41. Id. § 813(b)(1).
42. Id. § 813(c).
43. Id. § 105 cmt.
20111 933
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under section 105 seem to conflict with the provision of section 813,
when in doubt, the UTC favors disclosure to beneficiaries as the better
policy.
44
According to David English, the Reporter for the UTC, the
extent to which the settlor may waive the disclosure requirements was
the most discussed issue both during the drafting of the UTC and
after its adoption by NCCUSL. 45 The UTC seeks to "increase trustee
accountability, while at the same time reliev[e] the trustee of the
undue burden of having to identify and notify those holding truly
remote interests."46 English acknowledged that the UTC provisions
were a compromise with which both sides of the debate would not be
satisfied.47 English also noted that the waiver restrictions in section
105 of the disclosure duties would lead to a direct conflict between the
goal of effectuating settlor intent and the goal of making certain the
beneficiaries have sufficient information to enforce their rights.
48
Although it has not taken the extreme position of completely
mandatory disclosure, the UTC has chosen a rule that falls primarily
on the side of disclosure.
Four of the first ten jurisdictions to enact the UTC deleted
entirely the sections that mandate information disclosure. 49 This
reaction is precisely what English had predicted. 50 In response to this
diverse reaction to mandatory disclosure, the UTC was modified in
2004 by bracketing those subsections to indicate that the adopting
state may choose to make disclosure the default option, rather than
make it mandatory. 51 This does not appear to indicate a change in
policy within the UTC. Rather, it merely recognizes that enacting
states are in fierce dispute regarding the adoption of those
subsections. In some sense, while making its own position on
mandatory disclosure clear, the UTC abandoned its attempt to
establish a truly uniform disclosure requirement among the states. In
doing so, it moved away from the very purpose of its six-year quest: to
create a Uniform Trust Code that is universally recognized and
adopted.
44. English, supra note 28, at 199-200.
45. Millard, supra note 8, at 374-75 (discussing English, supra note 28, at 202).
46. English, supra note 28, at 200.
47. Id. at 203.
48. Id.
49. Alan Newman, Elder Law: The Intention of the Settlor Under the Uniform Trust Code:
Whose Property Is It, Anyway?, 38 AKRON L. REV. 649, 677 (2005).
50. See id. at 202 ("Early indications are that some of the states that will enact the UTC
will modify the waiver provision.!).
51. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8)-(9) (amended 2005).
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C. The Chosen Disclosure Regimes in UTC States
Because of the variance among states adopting the UTC, a lack
of uniformity remains regarding information disclosure. At the time
this Note was written, twenty-three jurisdictions had adopted the
UTC. 52 As mentioned above, no state has adopted both UTC sections
813 and 105(b) verbatim. The result is that trustees who manage
trusts governed by different states' trust laws5 3 must constantly keep
themselves apprised of the often vastly differing disclosure rules in
each state. The fact that most state statutes restrict, rather than
increase, the disclosure requirements of trusts indicates that the
majority of enacting states felt that a settlor's right to prohibit
information disclosure is more important than protecting the rights of
uninformed beneficiaries. This highlights the difficulty of drafting a
rule in this area that balances these competing policy goals in a way
that is acceptable to both sides.
The various state law provisions regarding disclosure range
from slight deviations from the UTC to exclusion of entire Code
provisions. The most common and interesting alterations are outlined
below.
1. Deviations from the General Duty to Inform and Report Under UTC
Section 813(a)
UTC section 813(a) imposes the general duty to keep the
qualified beneficiaries 54 informed about the administration of the trust
and to respond to a request for information received from any
beneficiary. Nearly half of the states that have enacted the UTC have
departed from this first requirement. The majority of states that alter
this section retain the first general duty to keep a qualified beneficiary
informed of the administration of the trust, but limit the second duty
to respond to a request for information from a qualified beneficiary, as
defined in the relevant code.55 Some other states take issue with the
52. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (detailing which states have adopted the
UTC).
53. The settlor is free to choose and indicate in the trust which state's trust law will govern
the trust instrument.
54. The specific requirements listed in the definition of a "qualified" beneficiary under the
UTC are designed to exclude those beneficiaries whose interests are remote and contingent, and
who thus are unlikely to have an interest in the day-to-day affairs of the trust. UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 103(13) cmt.
55. Eleven out of the twenty-three UTC states impose this further restriction, including:
Alabama, ALA. CODE § 19-3B-813(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0813
(West 2010); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-813(a) (2005 & Supp. 2009); Maine, ME. REV. STAT.
20111 935
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general nature of the first part of the duty, preferring a list of specific
duties.
56
2. Deviations from the Specific Duties Under
UTC Section 813(b)
UTC section 813(b) requires the trustee to (1) furnish a copy of
the trust instrument to any beneficiary upon request; (2) notify
qualified beneficiaries within sixty days of acceptance of trusteeship of
the trustee's name, address, and telephone number; (3) notify
qualified beneficiaries within sixty days of the creation of an
irrevocable trust, or the date that a revocable trust becomes
irrevocable, of the trust's existence, of the identity of the settlor(s), of
the right to request a copy of the trust instrument, and of the right to
a trustee's report; and to (4) notify the qualified beneficiaries in
advance of any change in the method or rate of the trustee's
compensation. As with the duties in section 813(a), some states again
limit the applicability of these specific duties to qualified beneficiaries
only.57 Pennsylvania goes one step further and only requires these
notifications after a settlor of a revocable or irrevocable trust has died
or has been adjudicated incapacitated.
58
Interestingly, despite the tendency of many states to restrict
the duty to disclose to a greater extent than does the UTC, only three
states have deviated from the common law principle codified in the
UTC which allows a beneficiary to receive a copy of the trust
instrument in its entirety. These three states limit the duty to furnish
a copy of the trust instrument to a beneficiary to those provisions of
the trust that describe the beneficiary's interests, as opposed to
furnishing a copy of the entire instrument.5 9 This seems to indicate
ANN. tit. 18-B, § 813.1 (Supp. 2010); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7814(1) (West
2010); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:8-813(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); North
Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-813(a)(2) (2009); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-
813(a)(2) (Supp. 2010); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-811(1) (Supp. 2010); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14A, § 813(a) (Supp. 2010); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-813(a) (2009).
56. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-8-813(a) (2009); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7780.3 (Supp. 2010).
57. The states that limit the duties in section 813(b) to qualified beneficiaries include:
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-813(b)(1)-(5); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-b § 813.1;
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.7814(2); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-
B:8-813(c)(1)-(3); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-813(b). As noted earlier, although each
state may slightly alter their own definition, "qualified beneficiary" is defined by the UTC to be a
beneficiary who is currently a distributee of trust income or who would be if either the current
distributees or the trust instrument terminated. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(13) (amended 2005).
58. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7780.3(b)-(e).
59. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10813(B)(1), (3) (Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 700.7814(2)(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-16-13(2)(b) (2010).
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that, where the trustee has the duty-whether mandatory or
discretionary-to furnish a copy of the trust instrument, the majority
of adopting states are reluctant to restrict the portions of the
instrument that are available to the beneficiary. Presumably, these
states find that if some information is going to be given to a
beneficiary, that information needs to be complete.
3. Deviations from the Mandatory Aspects of the Duty to Inform
Under UTC Subsections 105(b)(8), (9)
Over half of the UTC states have modified the section
regarding the mandatory nature of the duty to inform such that a
settlor can avoid any disclosure to the trust beneficiaries. 60 The
overwhelming response is extremely informative in the search for a
balance that will be acceptable to most, if not all, states.
As mentioned above, subsections (8) and (9) of UTC section
105(b) prohibit a settlor from eliminating (1) the trustee's duty to
inform beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who are at least twenty-
five years old of the existence of the trust, the identity of the trustee,
and the right to request trustee's reports; and (2) the trustee's duty to
respond to a beneficiary's request for information, whatever her age.
Eleven states, nearly half of the enacting jurisdictions, completely
removed the UTC subsections that mandate disclosure, enabling the
settlor to contract entirely out of disclosure to the trust beneficiaries.
These states include Arkansas, 61 Kansas,6 2 New Hampshire, 63 North
Carolina,64 North Dakota,65 South Carolina,6 6 Tennessee,
67 Utah,68
Vermont, 69 Virginia, 70 and Wyoming.7 1 On the other end of the
spectrum, only two states, Florida and Pennsylvania, make all aspects
60. As noted below, this effect is possible by either completely deleting the subsection that
makes disclosure a mandatory duty of the trustee or allowing the settlor to designate a surrogate
to receive information on behalf of the beneficiaries.
61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-105 (Supp. 2009).
62. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-105.
63. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:1-105 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-105 (2009).
65. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-09-05 (2010).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-105 (2009).
67. TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-105(b) (2007 & Supp. 2010).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-105(b) (Supp. 2010).
69. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 105 (Supp. 2010).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-541.05(b) (2007).
71. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-105(b) (2009).
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of the trustee's duty to inform and report to beneficiaries mandatory,
not merely the two aspects required under the UTC. 72
A few states merely tweak the mandatory duties rather than
take extreme stances. For example, Alabama 73 and Arizona 74 deleted
the first mandatory duty under the UTC, requiring only the duty to
provide trustee's reports upon request. Nebraska 75 limits the
mandatory disclosure only to the more general duty to keep a
beneficiary reasonably informed, similar to the common law
requirement, and to the duty to respond to requests for information,
rather than the more specific requirement of the UTC. Maine 76 and
Missouri77 limit the mandatory nature of the duty to respond to a
beneficiary's request for information to a duty to respond to a request
from a qualified beneficiary, rather than any beneficiary.
New Mexico adopted all of the language of the UTC's duty to
inform and report, 78 including making the two specific duties
mentioned above unwaivable. However, the New Mexico legislature
made one important addition: if the trustee is a regulated financial
services institution and the settlor makes a knowing waiver, all of the
trustee's duties to inform, including those two specific duties
mentioned above, can be waived by the settlor in the trust
instrument.79 The New Mexico approach suggests that the New
Mexico legislature felt that the interests of the beneficiary would be
well protected when a professional institutional trustee is appointed.
Presumably, it found that the policy concerns behind requiring
disclosure, particularly those relating to manipulation of a vulnerable
settlor, either do not exist when a professional institutional trustee is
appointed, or at least no longer outweigh policies favoring
nondisclosure. Perhaps New Mexico finds institutional trustees more
72. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736.0105(2)(r)-(t) (West 2010); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7705(b)(8)
(Supp. 2010).
73. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-105(b)(8) (LexisNexis 2007) (describing duty to "respond to the
request of a qualified beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for trustee's reports and other
information reasonably related to the administration of a trust").
74. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10105(b)(8) (Supp. 2010).
75. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3805(b)(8) (2008) (describing duty to "keep the qualified
beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed... to protect their interests" and "respond to the
request of a qualified beneficiary . . . for trustee's reports and other information reasonably
related to the administration of a trust").
76. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(2)(1) (Supp. 2010).
77. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(2)(9) (West 2007).
78. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-8-813 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
79. Id. § 46A-8-813(F).
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reliable since they are subject to regulation, unlike private trustees,
and because they have reputational capital to protect.
80
The most interesting deviation from the mandatory nature of
the duty to disclose was first adopted by Washington, D.C.8 1 and has
since also been adopted by Maine,8 2 Missouri,8 3 Ohio,8 4 and Oregon.8 5
Under this rule, a settlor may avoid the requirement for disclosure to
qualified beneficiaries by designating a surrogate to receive any
notice, information, and reports on behalf of the beneficiaries. The
surrogate is then charged with protecting the interests of the
beneficiaries. The appealing benefits of this approach are discussed in
more depth below.
III. THE POLICY DEBATE
When a state adopts the UTC in recognition of the need for
uniformity, but alters or omits a particular section, it usually does so
only where the state comes to a different policy conclusion.8 6 The
policy arguments affecting trust disclosure can be separated into two
distinct categories: those favoring mandatory disclosure and those
opposing such a requirement. The UTC's drafters, as well as many
legal scholars, favor mandatory disclosure as the better policy.
However, as outlined above, the majority of deviations restrict rather
than broaden the UTC duty to disclose. Therefore, the policy concerns
that advocate discretionary disclosure cannot be offhandedly discarded
in crafting a rule that has any hope of being adopted by most or all of
the states. Until these concerns can be addressed and reconciled, trust
law unification will remain elusive. This Part explores the dueling
policy concerns that have caused the deviations from the UTC
provisions.
80. See infra Part IV.B.3.
81. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1301.05(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
82. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3)(B).
83. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(3). The Missouri Uniform Trust Code only allows a settlor
to designate a surrogate to receive all mandatory notices as required by the statute, but still
requires that a trustee respond to the request of a qualified beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for
the trustee's reports and other information reasonably related to the administration of the trust.
Id. § 456.1-105(2)(9).
84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(C) (West 2007).
85. OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3)(b) (2009).
86. See, e.g., David F. Powell, The New Florida Trust Code: Part 1, 80 FLA. BAR J., July-
Aug. 2006, at 24, 24 (discussing Florida's adoption of the UTC); Valerie J. Vollmar, The Oregon
Uniform Trust Code and Comments, 42 WILLAMEWrE L. REV. 187, 188 (2006) ('The committee
had two fundamental goals in drafting the Oregon Uniform Trust Code (the Code): (1) retain
current Oregon law absent a very good reason to change it; and (2) promote uniformity among the




The arguments in favor of mandatory information disclosure
can be broken down into those concerning the beneficiaries, the
trustee, and the settlor, respectively. The key policy point in favor of
mandatory disclosure relates to beneficiaries. It states that trust
privacy denies beneficiaries the information they need to protect their
beneficial interests in the trust and to ensure that the settlor's actual
intentions are accomplished should a trustee deviate from that intent
or otherwise mismanage the trust.8 7 Although a court may require
access to the trust instrument should the beneficiaries initiate
litigation, failure to provide any trust information outside of litigation
provides a significant hurdle for the beneficiaries, who may not be
aware that a breach has even occurred. The logic is as basic as it gets:
one cannot protect oneself against that which is unknown. Further,
trustees must often interpret a settlor's intent when administering the
trust, and if the beneficiaries also have a copy of the trust instrument,
the beneficiaries can recognize when even a well-intentioned trustee
simply got it wrong.
Another potential reason for requiring information disclosure
to beneficiaries is that trust law allows settlors to name family
members as trustees without much interference. States allow family
members to be selected as trustees without imposing licensing
requirements or other minimum standards. In contrast, there are
numerous rules applicable to trust companies or other institutions
acting as trustees. Given settlors' largely unfettered ability to choose a
family member as a trustee, mandatory information disclosure to
beneficiaries could be justified as a necessary safeguard against
potential negligence and abuse in the absence of further regulation of
the trustee's capabilities.88  Regarding family-member trustees,
sunlight is likely the best medicine.
From the trustee's perspective, trust privacy poisons the
relationship between beneficiaries and trustees, causing suspicion of
trustees and potentially leading to litigation.8 9 For example, in
87. Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 595 (2008).
88. Donald D. Kozusko, In Defense of Quiet Trusts, TR. & EST., Mar. 2004, at 20, 21. The
reality of this concern can be seen in New Mexico's version of the UTC described above, which
requires disclosure unless the trustee is an institutional trustee, in which case the settlor can
waive disclosure to the trust beneficiaries. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-8-813(F) (LexisNexis Supp.
2009).
89. Foster, supra note 87, at 598. Trust privacy often puts the trustee in a position where




Fletcher v. Fletcher, a decision by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the
trust terms mandated that the trustee, a brother of the beneficiaries,
keep the management of the trust confidential and directed the
trustee to only provide the beneficiaries with certain portions of the
trust.90 When the beneficiaries' brother, the trustee, repeatedly stone-
walled their information requests, the beneficiaries became concerned
that the trustee was abusing his authority and felt compelled to seek
judicial assistance. 91
Similar to the suspicion of beneficiaries towards trustees who
refuse to provide information, courts often take the view that trustees
that conceal information from beneficiaries and act in secret are
suspect.92 Accordingly, a defense to claims against the trustee
regularly recognized by courts is that the trustee acted in good faith.
93
As mentioned above, surcharge litigation is on the rise and
nondisclosure by a trustee, even if the terms of the trust disallow
disclosure, can make defenses based on good faith more difficult to
articulate. 94 Further, disclosure can facilitate obtaining a binding
consent, release, or ratification of the trustee's actions from a
beneficiary. 9
5
There is also a possibility that trust terms that disallow
disclosure to beneficiaries may cause a trustee to violate another
common provision of trust law: that which requires a trustee to act in
good faith.96 In contrast to the defense of good faith, which may be
difficult to prove without disclosure, nondisclosure itself could
potentially be the basis for a claim that the trustee violated her
independent duty of good faith. If, acting consistently with the terms
of the trust, the trustee denies the existence of a trust when
questioned by a beneficiary (or otherwise misrepresents the terms of
the trust or its assets), then arguably the trustee would not be acting
in good faith with respect to the beneficiary, regardless of whether
doing so was consistent with the settlor's intent.
97
90. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 480 S.E.2d 488, 490 (Va. 1997).
91. Id. ("This situation [of secrecy], along with other facts, according to the allegations, has
resulted in 'an extremely strained relationship between' the brothers.").
92. Fitzsimons, supra note 1, at 41.
93. Id.
94. See id. at 40-41 ("Open disclosure of information is a clear indication of acting in good
faith, and envisioning a prudent process that does not include communication is hard, if not
impossible.").
95. Id. at 43.
96. See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (amended 2005) (making mandatory the
trustee's duty to "act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust
and the interests of the beneficiaries").
97. Newman, supra note 49, at 680.
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A recent case in the North Carolina Court of Appeals, currently
being appealed to the state's Supreme Court, highlights the potency of
this concern. In Wilson v. Wilson, a settlor created a trust in
accordance with North Carolina's Uniform Trust Code.98 As noted
above, North Carolina entirely removed the duty to keep beneficiaries
informed from the list of mandatory duties. 99 The trustee acted
entirely in accordance with the trust terms; however, the beneficiaries
nevertheless sued the trustee, alleging that he had violated his duty of
good faith by failing to provide them with an accounting of the trust. 100
The Court of Appeals chastised the trial court for "relying on the
commentary to our statutes, which is not binding."''1 1 The court then
held that two other mandatory provisions acted together to require the
trustee to provide the requested accounting. Those mandatory
provisions included (1) the duty of the trustee to act in good faith and
in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the
interests of the beneficiaries, and (2) the power of the court to take
any action and exercise any jurisdiction as may be necessary in the
interests of justice. 10 2 The court held that the accounting "was
reasonably necessary to enforce [the beneficiaries'] rights under the
trust, and therefore could not be legally withheld, notwithstanding the
terms of the trust instrument."' 10 3 Although North Carolina was the
first state to impose such a holding, any trustee operating in a UTC
state that allows complete nondisclosure risks similar liability.
Additionally, because the applicable statutes of limitations
begin to run upon disclosure to beneficiaries, a trust that disallows
disclosure removes the protections that a trustee has against delayed
litigation.10 4 Under the UTC, a one-year statute of limitations applies
to claims of breaches of the trustee's fiduciary duties. 10 5 The one-year
period begins to run on the date that the beneficiary receives a report
that adequately discloses the existence of a potential claim for breach
of trust and informs the beneficiary of the time allowed for
98. Wilson v. Wilson, 690 S.E.2d 710, 711 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
99. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36G-1-105 (2009). The legislative comments to this section also
expressly note that the duty to inform was intentionally omitted in order to allow a settlor to
override this duty.
100. Wilson, 690 S.E.2d at 711-12.
101. Id. at 716.
102. Id. at 714 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-1-105(2), (9)).
103. Id. at 716.
104. Foster, supra note 87, at 599 ("When a settlor waives trustee duties to account to and
inform beneficiaries, the trustee may ultimately pay the price for trust privacy. The trustee may
lose . . . 'vital protection from belated claims by beneficiaries whose challenges might ... have
been barred by doctrines of laches or estoppel or by applicable statutes of limitation.' ").
105. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1005(a) (amended 2005).
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commencing a proceeding. 0 6 If a trustee does not send this report to a
beneficiary because the trustee is bound by the terms of the trust that
mandate nondisclosure, then the trustee loses the benefit of such a
short statute of limitations on suits against her.
In cases where the one-year statute of limitations does not
apply, a proceeding must be commenced by the beneficiary against a
trustee for breach of trust within five years after the first of the
following to occur: the (1) removal, (2) resignation, or (3) death of the
trustee; the (4) termination of the affected beneficiary's interest in the
trust; or the (5) termination of the trust.107 However, until the
occurrence of one of those five conditions, the trustee is vulnerable to
litigation over events that may have occurred many years ago.108 Thus
disclosure can shorten the statute of limitations on actions against the
trustee from five years, if not even longer, to one year. This is "a
powerful risk management tool" for trustees and also seems to parallel
the very purpose of having statutes of limitations. 0 9
Finally, mandatory disclosure could also benefit vulnerable
settlors. While trusts are intended to protect settlors' estates from the
high costs of probate, for settlors who are vulnerable to exploitation by
a manipulative trustee, there may be no estate left to protect at
death. " ° "Living trust scams" have targeted and victimized millions of
elderly or incapacitated Americans. These scams bait settlors with
promises of reduced probate costs and increased privacy, but often
result in the depletion of all or most of the victims' estates.' The
scam artists, who convince the victims to authorize them as trustees of
the victims' estates, "prey on older Americans' concerns that their
estates will be subject to long and costly probate," and they often
misrepresent the benefits and costs of creating a trust rather than a
traditional will.112 They also frequently claim affiliation or
endorsement by trustworthy organizations such as the American
106. Id.
107. Id. § 1005(c).
108. The UTC comments explain that the principles of estoppel and laches still apply
regardless of the provisions on statutes of limitations. See id. § 1005 & cmts. Aside from
statutory and common law protections, in practice, knowledgeable trustees are likely to negotiate
contractual protections as well, including indemnification or exculpation clauses in the trust
instrument. The trustee can also, of course, raise its fees to compensate for this risk.
109. Fitzsimons, supra note 1, at 43.
110. Foster, supra note 87, at 585.
111. Id. at 585-86.
112. Press Release, FTC, FTC Testifies Before Senate Special Committee on Aging on Living
Trust Scams (July 11, 2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/O7/livingtrust.shtm (quoting Elaine




Association of Retired Persons ("AARP") in order to put the
individuals at ease and gain their confidence." 3 While the concerns for
beneficiaries and trustees are certainly more persuasive, this practical
concern for vulnerable settlors also supports mandatory disclosure.
B. Discretionary Disclosure
If disclosure protects both beneficiaries and trustees and helps
to make sure that the settlor's intentions are accomplished, why, then,
don't all states mandate information disclosure, at least to the level
required by the UTC?
The policy concerns that drive advocates of nondisclosure begin
with the fundamental belief that trust privacy promotes the settlor's
control over property by protecting the assets that settlors leave to
their chosen beneficiaries." 4 Through control over the information
that beneficiaries receive, settlors can preemptively insulate the trust
from collateral attacks by displeased beneficiaries. Beneficiaries who
disagree with the method of trust administration or the disbursement
of assets have ample opportunities to object to the action or inaction of
a trustee. Moreover, a beneficiary who is disappointed by the
allocation of the trust assets could potentially cause significant
distress for the trustee, incur costs or fees payable by the trust, and
cause harm to the trust and other beneficiaries. 1 5
Advocates of permitting nondisclosure to beneficiaries argue
that the settlor's intent ought to prevail over the beneficiary's desire
or need for information about the trust. 116 Donald Kozusko has noted
that it is "inconsistent with a respect for private property to prohibit
quiet trusts by specifying what trustees must disclose, even if it
contradicts a settlor's best judgment."" 7 The trust assets, after all,
were originally the assets of the settlor. During the settlor's lifetime,
she would have been free to give some or all of her belongings to a
relative or other party without any legal obligation to tell that person
113. Id. These scam artists also use gifts to soften up their victims and false documents to
lead them to believe that their savings are not currently safe in the bank. See Consumer Affairs,
California Sues 'Living Trust Mill", Feb. 23, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/
2005/calivingtrust.html (describing suit by California AG against Family First for defrauding
senior citizens); Sue Chan, Beware Living Trust Scams, CBS NEWS, Mar. 14, 2003, http://www.
cbsnews.comlstries/2003/3/14/eveningnews/consumer/main544102.shtml (describing the scam
by Alliance for Mature Americans in California).
114. Foster, supra note 87, at 572.
115. Richard L. Lyon & Kevin M. Murphy, Trust Wars-Clashes Between Trustees and
Beneficiaries, 42 MD. B.J. 14, 16 (2009).
116. Millard, supra note 8, at 392.
117. Kozusko, supra note 88, at 22.
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the manner in which that property had been managed. According to
these scholars, while there certainly are other concerns in the
administration of an irrevocable trust,118 the settlor's preferred
method of disposition of trust assets should still reign supreme.
Individuals often utilize trusts rather than wills because of the
privacy that trusts allow the decedent at death. Wills are public
record. Any attempt by an individual to, for example, leave support for
an illegitimate child or a more favored proportion of the estate for a
favorite child becomes public knowledge for everyone, not only family,
to discover. For many people, posthumous "exposure to publicity of
their own personality is distasteful, if not abhorrent."1 9 Thus, the
ability of trust instruments to avoid the public filings of probate and
maintain the privacy of the deceased, along with the amount and type
of wealth in the trust, the decedent's personal quirks, preferences
among her children, and any secret love-children, makes trusts an
attractive substitute to the traditional will.
Utilizing a trust rather than a will does not guarantee privacy,
however. Beneficiaries may be indiscrete regarding the trust
information or lose a copy of the instrument, either inadvertently or as
a result of theft. Thus, those that turn to the trust rather than the will
for its privacy benefits may desire to prohibit information disclosure to
the beneficiaries to ensure that privacy. As my father has said, the
best-kept secret is the secret kept best. In other words, if you don't want
trust information to be known beyond the beneficiaries, do not tell
anyone, including the beneficiaries.
Allowance of nondisclosure terms can also protect the trust
property. Settlors who are concerned about litigious beneficiaries may
desire to prohibit disclosure. This would provide the settlor with more
control over her legacy by discouraging potential challenges to trusts.
The money that would otherwise be expended in defending trusts goes
where the "settlors intended-to beneficiaries rather than lawyers."
120
Further, knowledge of an interest in a trust may encourage
certain types of beneficiaries to "take up a life of ease rather than
work and be productive citizens."' 21 Warren Buffett has famously been
118. As opposed to the gift given during life, the assets dispersed in a trust belong to the
trust until they are distributed to the beneficiaries, not to the original grantor or settlor.
Further, the settlor of an irrevocable trust, who is often deceased by the time of the distribution
of the trust assets, no longer has the power to alter the method of asset management, while the
grantor of a lifetime gift can continually change the investment strategy of her assets until the
point of gifting them, thus allowing for economic, financial, or other situational changes.
119. Foster, supra note 87, at 569 (quoting Rudd v. Searls, 160 N.E. 882, 886 (Mass. 1928)).
120. Id. at 572-73.
121. Joseph Kartiganer & Raymond H. Young, The UTC: Help for Beneficiaries and Their
Attorneys, 17 PROB. & PROP., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 18, 20; see also Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v.
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quoted as saying that he wants to give his children just "enough
money so that they would feel that they could do anything, but not so
much that they would feel like doing nothing."122 Beneficiaries may
decide not to be the productive citizens they would otherwise become.
The belief, whether accurate or illusionary, in their financial security
as trust beneficiaries may also incentivize them to take otherwise ill-
advised financial risks in their investments or other lifestyle choices.
A settlor may wish to keep the knowledge of a trust interest private in
order to avoid discouraging any efforts at self-advancement that might
be made by the beneficiary. Even the UTC, which favors disclosure,
appears to recognize this concern by permitting nondisclosure to
beneficiaries that have not reached the age of twenty-five.
Although mandatory disclosure offers trustees the protection of
a shorter statute of limitations on potential claims, allowance of
nondisclosure also provides significant benefits for trustees. Recently,
trust reforms have favored beneficiary rights. In this "era of
beneficiary empowerment," nondisclosure terms may be attractive to
trustees because beneficiaries who are not informed about their
interests in a trust are less likely to second-guess trustee decisions or
insist on an active role in trust management.
123
In addition to the personal privacy concerns of the settlor,
there are also strong concerns that mandating disclosure could expose
beneficiaries to serious safety risks. 124 The most famous example of
this safety concern followed the 1974 kidnapping of newspaper heiress
Patty Hearst. Although the kidnappers, the Symbionese Liberation
Army ("SLA"), ultimately sought attention perhaps even more than
money, it was the wealth of Patty's family that made her a target in
the first place. 25 Patty's grandfather, William Randolph Hearst, a
Woodward, 848 N.E.2d 1175, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing the privacy concerns
noted by Kartiganer and Young and holding that, while beneficiaries in Indiana are entitled to
an accounting of the trust, this right is limited to those remote contingent beneficiaries who are
named in the trust document).
122. This well-known sentiment by Warren Buffett has often been repeated by Buffett
throughout his lifetime. See, e.g., Richard I. Kirkland, Jr., Should You Leave It All to the
Children?, FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18; Interview by Charlie Rose with Warren Buffett (June
26, 2006), http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/345.
123. See Foster, supra note 87, at 575 (calling trust privacy a "buffer between beneficiary
and trustee'); Kozusko, supra note 88, at 22 ("Indeed, today's prevailing public policy calls for
fewer trust rules, not more detailed rights that increase compliance costs and invite legal
challenges.").
124. Foster, supra note 87, at 576.
125. For accounts and analysis of the kidnapping of Patty Hearst, her involvement in crimes
committed by the SLA, and her subsequent trial, see generally, DAVID BOULTON, THE MAKING OF




newspaper tycoon and multimillionaire, left a substantial fortune to
his family in a testamentary trust, whose terms were public record.126
While Patty's relationship to her grandfather and his wealth were
commonly known, other relatives revealed in the trust could also have
been at risk. After Patty's kidnapping, the trustees of this trust
petitioned California's probate court to seal the Estate of Hearst
probate files on the grounds that "use of the material in the probate
files would expose many hitherto unnoticed persons as members of the
family and reveal the locations of their homes and properties . . . ."127
The trustees' petition failed, however, due to the court's emphasis on
the public's right to access probate records. 128 Although the trustees
were not successful in California, similar arguments have worked in
different cases.
129
These very real safety concerns, in addition to the settlor's
privacy wishes, create strong incentives for states to enact trust codes
that allow settlors the option to waive information disclosure. The fact
that the majority of adopting states limited rather than expanded the
duty to inform indicates that any uniform law must allow for some
kind of nondisclosure to beneficiaries. However, the beneficiaries' need
to have access to sufficient information to protect their interests
cannot be ignored.
IV. INFORMATION SURROGATES: A COMPROMISE
The UTC is intended to promote uniformity in trust law among
the states, but uniformity has not been achieved with respect to the
issue of information disclosure. The departure in most states from the
UTC's stance on disclosure indicates that the drafters did not strike
the right balance between settlors' desire for secrecy and beneficiaries'
need for information. The variations among state trust laws
demonstrate that many jurisdictions have concluded that the benefits
of nondisclosure outweigh the benefits of mandatory disclosure.
However, as the majority of legal scholarship-as well as the UTC--
126. Although, as mentioned above, trusts are not required to go through the public probate
process, if the trust is created in the will document (such trusts are referred to as "testamentary
trusts"), then the existence of that trust, the property to be distributed through that trust, and
the beneficiaries of the trust are also part of the public probate record.
127. In re Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 822-23 (Ct. App. 1977).
128. Id. at 825. However, a temporary seal was placed on the records. Although this seal
was intended to be temporary, the records have remained under this "temporary" seal for over
thirty years. Nicole LaPorte, Trust Issues Tear at Hearst, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 27, 2005, at 10.
129. For example, a probate judge in Detroit "sealed the will of Martha Jean 'The Queen'
Steinberg to prevent 'souvenir hunters and other opportunists' from pillaging her property."
David Josar, Radio Host's Will Sealed by Judge, DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 25, 2000, at 6D.
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has established, beneficiaries' need for information sufficient to
protect their interests is simply too great to ignore completely.130
Thus, there is a need for a body of trust law that would both allow a
settlor to shape the manner and method of disclosure in order to meet
the specific needs of each set of circumstances 131 and also ensure that,
no matter what level of disclosure the trust allows beneficiaries, the
rights and interests of the trust beneficiaries are protected.
This Part advocates an administrative structure that allows
the settlor to designate a surrogate to receive information in lieu of
providing that information directly to the beneficiaries. This Part will
also discuss the alternative of appointing an institutional trustee in
lieu of a surrogate. While there are questions about the surrogate's
own potential liability, the surrogate option provides the best solution
to the disclosure debate. This option addresses concerns regarding
both beneficiaries' rights and settlor privacy. The surrogate approach
allows a settlor to structure her trust according to her individual
circumstances without the need to shop around among the states for
the most favorable trust law and an appropriate trustee who is
familiar with the trust law of the chosen state. This Part also suggests
that states that would otherwise completely delete mandatory
disclosure requirements from their trust laws should instead consider
the surrogate approach, or require appointment of an institutional
trustee, to ensure that even those beneficiaries of trusts in states that
prefer nondisclosure are protected.
A. The Surrogate Approach
An administrative structure already exists that presents a
solution to the disclosure dilemma. 132 This approach provides settlors
130. See supra Part II.A.
131. As noted earlier, the many situations that may call for either restricted or nonexistent
disclosure can include concerns of protecting the trust assets from over-litigious beneficiaries,
protecting the beneficiaries themselves from thieves or even from each other, and protecting the
privacy, and therefore the legacy, of the settlor.
132. English law has also recognized the dueling disclosure interests in trust administration
and has developed its own solution. Under English trust law, the beneficiaries of a trust have an
absolute right to copies of the entire trust instrument. However, the settlor of a trust may create
"wish letters" which are private communications between the settlor and the trustee, which
communicate to the trustee the manner in which the settlor desires that the trustee exercise her
discretion. This mechanism and its purposes are explored in the recent decision of the High
Court in Breakspear v. Ackland. [2008] EWHC (Ch) 220 [32] (Eng.). The court notes that the
wish letter may have two advantages: (1) "it preserves flexibility for the trustees in responding to
changes in the beneficiaries' circumstances which are not or cannot be foreseen by the settlor";
and (2) "[the] advantage may be summarized in the word confidentiality." Id. at [6]. Particularly,
the court notes that the settlor may wish to have a confidential "written expression of facts,
948 [Vol. 64:3:925
AGENTS IN SECRECY
with the option to maintain secrecy of any or all trust terms, including
even the existence of a trust, from certain or all beneficiaries, while
still insuring that the beneficiaries' interests are protected. First
created in Washington, D.C., 133 this system allows a settlor to avoid
the requirement for disclosure by designating a surrogate to protect
the interests of the beneficiaries and to receive any notice,
information, and reports on their behalf. Maine,
134 Missouri, 135
Ohio, 36 and Oregon 37 have all followed this approach and have
adopted versions of the surrogate structure, evidencing the appeal of
this system.
The typical statute creating the surrogate option is similar to
UTC section 105, which outlines the default and mandatory rules of
the Code. Where the two systems diverge, however, is that UTC
section 105 does not allow waiver of UTC section 813 duties to (1)
notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust, the identity of the
trustee, and of their right to request trustee's reports, and (2) respond
to information requests. 38 In contrast, the typical state statute
creating a surrogate option provides that the trust may override these
particular section 813 duties, at least in situations where the trust
instrument designates a person, including a beneficiary, to act in good
faith to protect the interests of those beneficiaries who are not
receiving reports or other information required under section 813.
For example, the Maine Uniform Trust Code provides that
trust terms may prevail over the trustee's otherwise mandatory
disclosure duties in one of two ways. First, these duties may be
avoided where the terms of the trust waive these duties with respect
to all qualified beneficiaries except the settlor's spouse during the
beliefs, expectations, concerns and (occasionally) prejudices about the beneficiaries which ...
might be hurtful ... to include in a document which the beneficiaries had a right to inspect." Id.
The court upholds the confidentiality of these wish letters against the demand by the
beneficiaries of the trust in question to see them. Id. at [52]. The court did, however, recognize
that where the wish letter contains "relevant background material" which is the subject of
litigation, then the wish letter may become disclosable, regardless of its confidentiality. Id. at
[61].
This English solution to the disclosure problem is an interesting study; however, the wish
letter structure is outside the scope of this Note, which seeks a solution to the disclosure problem
within the American trust law structure.
133. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1301.05(c)(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
134. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3)(B) (Supp. 2010).
135. MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(3) (West 2007).
136. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5801.04(C) (West 2007).
137. OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3) (2009).
138. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8)-(9) (amended 2005).
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settlor's or the spouse's lifetime.139 Second, these duties may be waived
if the trust designates a surrogate to receive information on behalf of
the beneficiary. Specifically, the duties are waived if the trust terms:
Designat[e] a person or persons, any of whom may or may not be a beneficiary, to act in
good faith to protect the interests of the qualified beneficiaries who are not receiving
notice, information or reports and to receive any notice, information or reports required
under section 813, subsection 1 or 2 in lieu of providing such notice, information or
reports to the qualified beneficiaries. 
1 40
Thus, Maine provides for a surrogate option that provides the
same mandatory disclosure required under the UTC, but shifts the
trustee's duty to report to a representative-the surrogate-rather
than to the beneficiaries.
The Missouri Uniform Trust Code, which also utilizes the
surrogate option, offers a more compromising approach that still
requires disclosure to beneficiaries in certain circumstances. Missouri
does not make it possible to waive all duties of disclosure to
beneficiaries. Rather, the Missouri Uniform Trust Code only allows a
settlor to designate a surrogate to receive all mandatory notices as
required by the statute,'4 ' but still requires that a trustee respond to
the request of a qualified beneficiary for the trustee's reports and
other information reasonably related to the administration of the
trust. 142 Therefore, if a beneficiary discovers the existence of the trust
and requests information, the trustee may be required to provide that
information if it is "reasonably related to the administration of the
trust."143
139. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3)(A). The purpose behind allowing nondisclosure
when the settlor's spouse is still alive and receiving information is unclear. While it is true that
the decedent's spouse may have similar motives as the decedent regarding the desire to maintain
the decedent's privacy, it is not true that the spouse will always have the beneficiaries' best
interests in mind. Therefore, it is unclear why Maine allows this exception from mandatory
disclosure and from the surrogate alternative. What is further unnerving is that, by
distinguishing the spouse exception from the surrogate exception, Maine appears to be excepting
spouses from the duties which Maine imposes on a surrogate, including the duty to act in good
faith.
140. Id. § 105(3)(B).
141. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(3) (West 2007). These mandatory notices include the duty
of a trustee of an irrevocable trust to notify each qualified beneficiary who has attained the age
of twenty-one years of the existence of the trust and the duty to inform each qualified beneficiary
of their right to request trustee's reports. Id. § 456.1-105.2(8).
142. Id. § 456.1-105(2)(9).
143. Id.
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B. Giving Shape to the Surrogate Form
While the surrogate structure has gained favor in several
states, it has generally been dismissed by trust scholars. The biggest
criticism appears to be the failure of states to define the specific
responsibilities of the surrogate to the beneficiaries. 144 For example,
Professor Alan Newman notes that the Washington, D.C. Uniform
Trust Code does not provide whether reporting to a surrogate is
sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations on any
potential claims by the beneficiaries against the trustee. 45 Other
questions that have been raised include whether the surrogate could
bring an action on behalf of the beneficiaries against the trustee for
breach of fiduciary duty and the manner in which the beneficiaries
could maintain an action against the surrogate with respect to the
surrogate's duty to act in good faith to protect the beneficiaries'
interests. 146 While the lack of guidance for the functioning of the
surrogate model is a serious flaw, it can be overcome.
1. The Specific Responsibilities of an Information Surrogate
The first logical administrative issue is determining the
standards of conduct that should be applicable to the surrogate that
ensure that the surrogate fulfills her duties and is held accountable.
147
144. Newman, supra note 49, at 680.
145. Id. at 681.
146. Alan Newman, The Uniform Trust Code: An Analysis of Ohio's Version, 34 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 135, 186 (2008).
147. One group of scholars has recommended the following language be included in the trust
instrument in order to designate the surrogate:
The Settlor understands that notice concerning this trust to certain beneficiaries is
necessary to permit them to protect their rights and that these rights may otherwise
be seriously compromised. On the other hand, the Settlor believes that it is in the
beneficiaries' best interests not to know about the trust in order to allow the
beneficiaries to make their own way in the world and thereby to strengthen their
character.
Accordingly, the Settlor directs that all notice required to be provided to any
beneficiary be provided to the Settlor's brother John or, if he is not available, as
hereinafter defined, to the Settlor's sister Mary or, if she is not so available, to the
then partner in charge of the law firm, or any of its successors, that prepared this
Agreement. The person so designated shall receive notice in a non-fiduciary capacity
and is directed not to communicate any information about this trust, including its
existence, to any beneficiary, unless the person so designated cannot articulate a
reasonable basis for deciding not to communicate such information.
The person so designated shall be entitled to all costs associated with reviewing or
retaining professional advisors to review information provided by the Trustee, and
such costs shall be a charge against the trust. Nevertheless, no duty is imposed on
such person, whether or not such person undertakes any inquiry or ignores all
information provided.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The appropriate standard of conduct could be imported from the
trustee's standard, already operable in trust law, of good faith, as well
as other fiduciary duties. More specific standards of conduct from
preexisting sections of the UTC can also be extended to apply to the
surrogate.
Several state statutes provide that the applicable standard
when creating the surrogate option is the standard of "good faith."'
148
The standard of good faith is the same standard to which the trustees
are held.149 While this standard could have different meanings in
different contexts, those statutes that have instituted the surrogate
option almost certainly contemplate that this term will have the same
meaning for both trustees and surrogates. This also suggests that a
surrogate will be held to the same fiduciary standards that apply to
trustees including the duties of prudence, loyalty, and impartiality. 1,50
While the UTC and the Restatement discuss fiduciary duties in
language specific to trustees, the surrogate would also have similar
fiduciary duties. For example, a surrogate must act prudently when
making decisions on behalf of the beneficiaries, with loyalty to the
beneficiaries' interests (refraining from pursuing or choosing not to
pursue a claim for the surrogate's own benefit), and impartially when
exercising her power, particularly when one surrogate has been
designated to act on behalf of several beneficiaries.
Guidance regarding the responsibilities of the surrogate can
also be found in the specific language of the UTC. As Kozusko points
out, UTC section 808, which addresses persons or institutions with the
power to direct the actions of the trustee,151 allows settlors to provide
for specialized fiduciaries and to provide standards of liability for such
Steven M. Fast, et al., Drafting to Excess, SJO01 ALI-ABA 109, 125-26 (2003). Because this
suggestion purports to relieve the surrogate from all duties, seemingly including the duty to act
in good faith, this approach is not pursued in this Note.
148. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3)(B) (Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5801.04(C) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.020(3)(b) (2009).
149. Section 808 of the UTC states the affirmative duty of the trustee to act in good faith
and the comments to that section and section 801 reference the long standing history of a
trustee's fiduciary duties as explained in sections 164 through 169 of the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 801 cmt. (amended 2005). Section 169 states the general duty of a
trustee to administer the trust. Courts have interpreted this section to require the trustee to
administer the trust in good faith in order to comply with her fiduciary duties. See, e.g., In re
Hartzell's Will, 192 N.E.2d 697, 706 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) ("[The trustee] is held to a high standard
of conduct and must exercise the utmost or highest good faith in the administration of the
trust.").
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 70 cmt. a (2003). The exact fiduciary duties and
responsibilities of the trustee are outlined in chapters 15-17 of the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts. These duties are also outlined in sections 801-817 in the UTC.
151. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 (amended 2005).
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fiduciaries.' 52 While that section is directed at the use of trust
protectors and advisors 153 rather than surrogates, the section can
provide guidance on the manner in which a trustee should deal with a
person who owes fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries.
As a threshold matter, section 808 discusses the interaction of
a trustee with an individual who has "the power to direct" certain
actions of the trustee. This section provides one of the few instances in
the UTC where the duties of a third party are discussed in the context
of this party's interaction with a trustee. The powers of the surrogate
could not exceed the powers of a beneficiary to act on perceived
breaches of the trustee's fiduciary duties. Therefore, the extent to
which a surrogate's "power" could be deemed a "power to direct"
sufficient to bring the surrogate under section 808 is unclear.
A person who falls under section 808's umbrella-a person
"who hold[s] a power to direct"-is required to "act in good faith with
regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the
beneficiaries."'154 While the responsibilities of persons with powers to
direct and the responsibilities of surrogates are different, the
similarity of this "good faith" requirement to that mentioned for
surrogates in the trust code statutes of Maine, Ohio, and Oregon
supports section 808's extension to the administration of the surrogate
system. Section 808 further states that "the holder of a power to direct
is liable for any loss that results from breach of a fiduciary duty."155
The standards of conduct and level of liability outlined in section 808
fit comfortably with the expectations of a surrogate. Therefore, it is
practical to extend the section to cover surrogates.
In addition to specifying the requirements of someone with a
power to direct, section 808 also addresses the responsibilities of a
trustee while interacting with a person who has the power to direct.
Section 808 instructs that the trustee shall not act in accordance with
the exercise of power by such a person if the trustee knows the
attempted exercise would constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary
152. Kozusko, supra note 88, at 22. Section 808(b) of the UTC provides:
If the terms of the trust confer upon a person other than the settlor of a revocable
trust the power to direct certain actions of the trustee, the trustee shall act in
accordance with an exercise of the power unless the attempted exercise is manifestly
contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee knows the attempted exercise would
constitute a serious breach of a fiduciary duty that the person holding the power owes
to the beneficiaries of the trust.
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(b).
153. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt.




duty.156 This requirement would also be appropriately extended to the
trustee's duties when interacting with a surrogate.
The trust code for a state can easily be revised to provide that
the fiduciary standards present in other areas of trust law are equally
applicable to information surrogates. This revision can be done in
several ways. The various sections that outline the trustee's fiduciary
duties can be broadened to also address those of the surrogate. For
example, the state's equivalent of section 813 could be rewritten as
follows:
If a trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee shall act impartially in investing,
managing, and distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries'
respective interests. If an information surrogate receives information on behalf of two or
more beneficiaries, the surrogate shall act impartially in ensuring that all the
beneficiaries' respective interests are protected. 
15 7
However, this approach would require numerous changes
because many of the statutory provisions are written to address the
specific duties of a trustee and may need to be entirely rewritten to
cover the duties of a surrogate.
A better approach would be to redraft section 808 to cover those
persons with "powers to direct" as well as information surrogates. This
revision would require minimal effort on the part of the state
legislatures and would smooth the transition to the surrogate
approach. Compared to the previous example, only a subject addition
would need to be included. To illustrate, section 808(d) could be
altered to read:
(d) An information surrogate or a person, other than a beneficiary, who holds a power to
direct is presumptively a fiduciary who, as such, is required to act in good faith with
regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries. The
information surrogate or holder of a power to direct is liable for any loss that results
from breach of a fiduciary duty.
15 8
Even if a state chose to leave the section unrevised the
surrogate structure could still operate. For example, where the trust
law in a given state does not make reference to the responsibilities
and potential liability of an information surrogate, the trust
instrument could be drafted to make these standards clear, or the
court could choose to apply fiduciary law standards should any
litigation occur.
156. Id. § 808(b).
157. See id. § 803 (proposed additions are italicized).
158. See id. § 808 (proposed additions are italicized).
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2. Statute of Limitations for Actions Against the Trustee and the
Standing of the Surrogate to Bring Actions on Behalf of the
Beneficiaries
Existing trust law is also competent to deal with any perceived
statute of limitations ambiguities for claims against the trustee. Most
states' trust codes provide that the statute of limitations begins to run
when the beneficiary or a representative of the beneficiary receives a
report that adequately discloses the existence of a potential claim for
breach of trust and informs the beneficiary of the time allowed for
commencing a proceeding. 159 The question is whether a surrogate acts
as a representative, or the functional equivalent of a representative, of
a beneficiary for the purposes of the statute of limitations.
160
Some states have found simple ways to resolve this issue. The
Maine Uniform Trust Code indicates that when surrogates are
designated to receive information on behalf of certain or all
beneficiaries, those surrogates are "deemed to be representatives of
the qualified beneficiaries not receiving notice, information or reports
for the purposes of the time limitation for a beneficiary to commence
an action against the trustee for breach of trust. .".."161 The Ohio
Trust Code also clarifies this issue by explicitly stating that the
statute of limitations begins upon receipt of notice by the beneficiary,
its representative, or a beneficiary surrogate.162 The advantages of
having an explicit provision that establishes that the surrogate acts as
a representative for the purposes of starting the statute of limitations
are evident. That those trust codes and the UTC do not define
"representative" indicates that the term is not limited and can easily
include the surrogate. The comments to the Code, discussed below,
bolster this conclusion by suggesting the breadth of the term. The
failure of Washington, D.C.'s, Missouri's, and Oregon's trust laws to
clarify this point is unfortunate, but not fatal to the functioning of the
surrogate system.
With respect to the surrogate's ability to take action on behalf
of beneficiaries, the comments to the UTC provide some guidance.
While the UTC's drafters may not have predicted the creation of the
surrogate approach, their official comments suggest that, had they
incorporated the surrogate approach to the uniform code, a surrogate
would have clear standing to bring actions against the trustee on
159. See, e.g., id. § 1005(a).
160. The UTC does not define the term "representative" nor elaborate on who can fulfill that
role.
161. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(3)(B) (Supp. 2010).
162. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5810.05(A) (West 2007).
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behalf of the beneficiaries. Section 1001 of the UTC states that "[a]
violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes a beneficiary is a
breach of trust."'163 The official comments to this section provide that
"a person who may represent the beneficiary's interest under Article 3
would have standing to bring a petition on behalf of the person
represented."' 164 Article 3 of the UTC outlines the responsibilities and
appointment of representatives for beneficiaries of a trust. The
comments to section 315, titled "Appointment of Representative," state
that the term "representative" was used rather than "guardian ad
litem" to emphasize that a representative in trust law serves a
different role. The comments further indicate that a representative
can be appointed to receive a notice on a beneficiary's behalf.165 The
drafters' general comment to Article 3 also emphasizes that "[s]ettlors
are free to specify their own methods for providing substituted notice
and obtaining substituted consent."'166 Much of this language appears
to be directed toward representatives of beneficiaries who are not
deemed to be "qualified beneficiaries" due to age or remote interest
and therefore are not entitled to information and reports from the
trustee. However, this language is broad enough to extend to the
relationship between a surrogate and a beneficiary, establishing that
a surrogate would have standing to bring actions on behalf of the
beneficiaries. As Anne O'Brien noted, "the [general] Comment seems
to bless the approach of crafting representation provisions into the
terms of a particular trust itself, that is to say, naming an individual
or individuals who can receive information and reports on behalf of
the beneficiary and thereby represent and bind the beneficiary."'
167
3. Potential Actions by the Beneficiaries Against the Surrogate
Two other important issues concerning the information
surrogate deserve further analysis. First, the length of the statute of
limitations for an action by the beneficiary against the surrogate for
breach of the duty of good faith is not referenced in any of the state
163. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1001(a).
164. Id. cmt.
165. Id. § 315 cmt. Further, although Tennessee has not adopted the surrogate approach,
Tennessee amended its uniform trust provision on appointment of a representative to state
explicitly that "[a] person designated by the settlor in the trust instrument or in a writing
delivered to the trustee to represent the beneficiaries of the trust may represent and bind such
beneficiaries." TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15--303(7) (Supp. 2010).
166. Id. art. 3 cmt.
167. Anne J. O'Brien, The Trustee's Duty to Provide Information to Beneficiaries: When Can
the Settlor Say 'Don't Ask, Won't Tell"?, at 5-22 to 5-23. (2006 Heckerling Inst. on Estate
Planning, Jan. 11, 2006).
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codes that have adopted the surrogate approach. Second, the manner
in which the beneficiary can discover a breach is unclear. However, in
practice, neither of these problems appears unsolvable.
None of the state trust codes allowing use of a surrogate
indicates what the statute of limitations is for actions by the
beneficiary against the surrogate. While this may seem to present a
problem, a court can choose to apply the same statute of limitations
currently outlined in the trust code that applies to actions against the
trustee or the default statute of limitations in that jurisdiction. Under
the UTC, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
breach of trust is discovered in situations where information is not
provided to beneficiaries. It is likely that the same rule would be
applied by the courts in actions against surrogates. This possibility
may make it difficult for a settlor to find an individual willing to act as
surrogate under the trust, or at least make the appointment
expensive. However, because this knowledge will be factored into the
contract price for appointment, it is not clear if this would be unfair to
the surrogate, particularly one who has no intention of acting in bad
faith.
More troublesome is the failure of the five states with
surrogate options to create a system that regularly monitors the
actions of the surrogate to ensure that she is acting in good faith to
protect the beneficiaries' interests with the information she receives.
In practice, beneficiaries may discover evidence suggesting a breach of
good faith by trustees even without mandated disclosure. For example,
in a trust that limits disclosure to beneficiaries in any one of the ten
states that currently allow waiver of all information disclosure, a
beneficiary can discover the actions of trustees in a variety of ways:
(1) the beneficiary may receive a trust distribution at odds with
expectations; (2) the beneficiary may see other family members
receiving greater amounts than the beneficiary is receiving; (3) if the
existence of the trust is known, the trustee may be responding oddly to
requests for information, thus raising the beneficiary's suspicion; or
(4) information about the trust may simply be leaked from the trustee.
While the actions of information surrogates might also be discovered
incidentally, this is not as likely to occur since the role of the surrogate
is much less active than that of a trustee. While beneficiaries may
"bump up against" the truth of a breach of good faith by a surrogate,
the legal system should not rely on such luck to ensure fairness.
The vulnerability of beneficiaries to a surrogate who breaches
her fiduciary duties can be greatly lessened by a requirement that the
surrogate be a regulated financial institution. This approach is
already evident in New Mexico's trust law. As mentioned above, New
2011]
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Mexico mandates the same disclosure duties as the UTC. However, if
the trustee is a regulated financial services institution and the settlor
makes a knowing waiver, all of the trustee's duties to inform can be
waived by the settlor in the trust instrument. 168 Thus, the New Mexico
legislature concluded that a beneficiary is not at risk when the
surrogate is a financial institution, and that as a result the policy
concerns that would advocate mandating disclosure are not as strong.
This conclusion seems correct.
The requirement of an institutional surrogate can be indicated
by defining the term "surrogate" to require that the designated
surrogate be a financial institution, or by placing that requirement
directly in the provision that allows the surrogate's appointment.
Under this system, the same regulated institutions that often act as
trustees would also be acting as surrogates in unrelated trusts.
Therefore, not only would they be competent to monitor for breaches
in the trustees' duties, but they would also be interested in performing
their duties in a professional manner and enhancing their reputations
as professional fiduciaries.
Alternatively, for many of the same reasons, the beneficiaries'
interests would be protected in a trust that prohibits disclosure where
a financial services institution has been appointed as trustee. This is
precisely the position of the New Mexico trust code. However, a
jurisdiction that only allows a settlor to prohibit disclosure when an
institutional trustee is appointed may not be sufficient. There are
many reasons that a settlor may prefer to appoint an individual as a
trustee, rather than an institution. For example, an individual may
not be as constrained as a regulated financial institution in the type of
investments that the trustee will consider. Or, the settlor may simply
prefer that a close relative administer the trust for her beneficiaries.
The precise definition of what types of institutions would
satisfy the requirement for a "financial services institution" sufficient
to be appointed as a surrogate or institutional trustee is beyond the
scope of this Note. Generally speaking, the definition should require
that the institution have a certain amount of assets under
management in a fiduciary capacity. This would ensure that the
institution would be competent to serve as trustee or surrogate for a
trust in which disclosure to beneficiaries is prohibited.
The greatest weakness of the institutional surrogate
alternative is that it would likely be expensive. However, if the settlor
has determined that an individual should be the trustee and the
disclosure of information should be limited or prohibited, the settlor
168. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 46A-8-813 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
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should bear the cost of those decisions. If an institutional trustee is
appointed, the statute should allow information to be withheld.
Therefore, where a trustee is a regulated financial services institution,
a surrogate should not be required in order for the settlor to prohibit
disclosure. However, if an individual serves as trustee and the trust
instrument limits or prohibits disclosure, the public policy concerns
behind the argument for full disclosure should require the
appointment of a financial institution as a surrogate to avoid
disclosure to the beneficiaries.
The requirement of an institutional fiduciary, including an
institutional surrogate, reduces the vulnerability of beneficiaries.
Even with the remaining ambiguity regarding the surrogate's own
liability, the surrogate option provides the most appealing solution to
the disclosure debate. It addresses both sides of the debate and allows
a settlor to structure her trust in the particular manner needed in her
individual circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the extent and mandatory nature of a trustee's
duty to provide beneficiaries with information is a contentious one.
Two fundamental and well-established standards in trust law are at
issue. First, settlors have broad latitude to construct their trusts as
they see fit. Second, trusts exist solely for the benefit of the
beneficiaries thereof. While these two principles have coexisted for
many years, the complexities of their interaction in trust disclosure
could be sidestepped in common law judicial decisions where the
equities in a particular case made one of the principles yell slightly
louder than the other.
The codification and unification of trust law in the UTC made
this ad hoc dance less possible. The time had come to choose sides.
With uniformity in mind, the drafters of the UTC constructed the
trustee's duty to inform as a partially waivable duty, but with certain
responsibilities that the settlor could not waive. The UTC was
attempting to find a compromise between the strong policies
mandating information disclosure and a settlor's freedom to choose
the manner in which she wants to dispose of her property, including in
secrecy.
While the drafters of the UTC are correct that access to
information is essential to beneficiaries, not all states were ready to
impose such constraints on individuals' ability to choose the terms of
their trust. The surrogate structure offers the most readily accessible
solution to the disclosure debate that will protect the beneficiaries'
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interest while still allowing contract freedom for settlors, which is
valued highly by many states. The initial surrogate approach in
Washington, D.C. does not provide much explicit guidance regarding
the exact responsibilities, authority, or liability of the surrogate. But
while these issues are very important, they are not as ambiguous as
they might at first seem.
Reconciling existing trust law principles and the more refined
versions of the surrogate approach outlined above can provide answers
to these concerns. At least one proponent of allowing nondisclosure
has proposed that the current lack of guidance should not distract
legislatures from adopting the surrogate approach. As Donald
Kozusko has articulated, "[i]f accountability can be managed by other
means, does it still make sense to thwart a settlor's desire to minimize
disclosure to beneficiaries?"'169 Kozusko proposes that the surrogate
structure creates opportunities to design what he calls "quiet trusts"
to satisfy many legitimate objectives, but without tolerating
mismanagement. 1
70
The surrogate ensures that the trustee remains accountable for
her actions. In addition, use of a surrogate allows the settlor to
prevent the disclosure of information if the settlor so desires.
Therefore, a closer look by the states at the surrogate structure is
warranted in light of its ability to bridge the gap between trust
scholars and the UTC, on the one hand, and the majority of UTC-
enacting states that eliminated the mandatory disclosure
requirement, on the other. This Note began that process. This is not a
trust panacea--there are still ambiguous aspects of the liability the
surrogate may face in the event of a breach of the duty of good faith.
Nevertheless, this approach could increase the number of states that
would enact disclosure requirements for someone who has the
beneficiary's interests in mind, thereby also promoting the uniformity
so important to trust law.
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